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Abstract 
Although social scientists have been investigating the nature and impact of job 
satisfaction for many decades, economists only started to investigate job 
satisfaction systematically in the late 1980’s. Almost from the first systematic 
studies of job satisfaction by economists, the research potential of the notion of 
pay level comparisons was realized. The idea of pay level comparisons in job 
satisfaction has proven particularly useful also because it has important 
implications for a number of standard theoretical and economic policy results. 
However, the inclusion of the variable of comparison wage in job satisfaction 
and the resulting supporting empirical findings, are in sharp contrast to the 
orthodox approach, given that in mainstream economic theory an individuals’ 
utility is assumed to be a function of absolute income only. Despite the 
important theoretical and policy implications, mainstream economic theory has 
not paid much heed to the job satisfaction conceptual formulations and 
empirical findings. The paper argues that there are methodological reasons for 
this state of affairs which seem to be linked to the subjective well-being 
research in general, and to the job satisfaction literature in particular. A strong 
mistrust against the method of stated preferences and the inherent 
methodological bias against the integration of psychological findings, are 
suggested as the two prime reasons. Although a few prominent figures in job 
satisfaction research have realized the mainstream methodological attitude, it 
is necessary that job satisfaction specialists should consider more seriously the 
basic components of mainstream economic methodology that relate to their 
research field.  
 
JEL codes: J28; B4; I31; J30 
Key words: job satisfaction, pay level comparisons, wages; economic 
methodology  
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I. Introduction 
Social scientists have been researching the nature and impact of job 
satisfaction for many decades. Psychologists and especially industrial and 
occupational psychologists, were the first to concentrate on the issue.1 The 
seminal work of Edwin Locke who suggested one of the first job satisfaction 
models, is an indicative example (Locke, 1976). Other specialists such as 
industrial relations and human resource management followed, and nowadays 
the study of job satisfaction is an established research area in its own right (e.g. 
Argyle, 1989; Spector, 1997; Judge et al, 2017).   
 
On the contrary, economists started to investigate job satisfaction 
systematically only in the late 1980’s.  Although there were a few pioneering 
papers mainly by Dan Hamermesh 1977; Richard Freeman 1978, and Richard 
Layard 1980, the impact of job satisfaction on economic variables were not 
considered a legitimate or an interesting field.  Economists were reluctant to 
investigate job satisfaction mainly because of its allegedly highly subjective 
nature and also because personal judgements of satisfaction and other 
subjective opinions were considered a research field more appropriate to other 
social scientists. However, in the late 1980’s an increasing number of 
economists started to appreciate the significance of job satisfaction as an 
economic variable. This trend was also strengthened by Akerlof et al (1988) 
finding that earnings and hours of work are not of sole or even of primary 
importance in determining productivity and well-being at work. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
1 For a historical account of psychological research on job satisfaction, see Latham and 
Budworth, 2007. 
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emergence and growth of large-scale labour market surveys that included 
questions about how much workers are satisfied with their job, was another 
factor that contributed to the increasing interest to job satisfaction. Job 
satisfaction research was also deemed to be important for analysing and 
predicting many key economic variables such as: labour turnover, labour 
productivity, pay differentials, workers’ absenteeism, quits, the role of gender 
and the degree of unionism in the labour market (e.g. Borjas, 1979; Clark, 1997; 
Clark, 2001; Hamermesh, 2001; Shields and Price, 2002; Böckerman and 
Ilmakunnas, 2008; Card, Mas, Moretti and Saez, 2012; Drakopoulos and 
Grimani, 2013). Finally and considering the recent boom of the related field of 
happiness research, job satisfaction is viewed as an important predictor of 
overall well-being (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 
2000; Bonsang and Van Soest, 2012).  
 
Almost from the first systematic studies of job satisfaction by economists, the 
research potential of the notion of pay level comparisons was realized. The 
early papers by Hamermesh (1977) and Layard (1980) suggested that pay level 
comparisons matter for job satisfaction. Subsequently, the seminal paper by 
Clark and Oswald (1996) concentrated exclusively on testing the role of relative 
or comparison income on job satisfaction. Since then, a substantial body of 
literature has found that pay level comparisons is an important variable affecting 
job satisfaction. Indicative examples are: Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Brown et al 
2008; Senik, 2009; Card et al, 2012; Kifle 2014; Godeshot and Senik, 2015.  
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However, the inclusion of the variable of comparison wage in job satisfaction 
and the resulting supporting empirical findings, are in sharp contrast to the 
standard approach, given that in mainstream economic theory an individuals’ 
utility is assumed to be a function of absolute income only (Clark and Oswald, 
1996: 373)2. Apart from presenting a challenge to the standard utility analysis, 
the wider theoretical and policy implications of the pay level comparisons also 
undermine many established economic results. The negative externality of the 
high earners reference group implies that many conventional optimal tax policy 
conclusions and income distribution recommendations are challenged.  
 
Despite the above important theoretical and policy implications, mainstream 
economic theory has not incorporated the conceptual formulations and 
empirical findings of the job satisfaction literature. Although the mainstream 
aversion to any criticism of the standard model of rational agents is also present 
here, there are other reasons relating to the specific job satisfaction findings. 
These reasons are to be found in the established economic methodology. First, 
mainstream economics exhibits a negative methodological attitude towards the 
validity of stated preferences and survey evidence approach that is employed 
in the vast majority of the pay level comparisons research (see Manski, 2004; 
Easterlin, 2004). The second methodological aspect has to do with the inherent 
anti-psychologism of mainstream economics (for a discussion, see Bruni and 
Sugden, 2007). Since its beginnings the study of job satisfaction in relation to 
economic variables has had a strong influence from psychological research. 
However, mainstream economics has a long negative tradition towards 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the definition and nature of mainstream economics, see Lawson, 2006. 
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integrating psychology-based research findings. The consequences of these 
issues for job satisfaction research is also part of the paper’s concern. Thus, 
the paper will start by examining the main theoretical settings and empirical 
results of the pay level comparisons in job satisfaction. The next section will 
focus on the theoretical basis regarding the effect of comparison wage on job 
satisfaction. Section four will discuss the main theoretical and policy 
implications of the pay level comparisons. The next section will concentrate on 
the methodological reasons for the limited impact of the relevant literature on 
standard economic theory and policy. A concluding section will close the paper.  
 
II. Pay Level Comparisons in Job Satisfaction 
Traditionally, job satisfaction is assumed to be determined by a number of 
variables.).3 The standard approach to an individual's utility from working is 
given as: 
                   
 JS = f(w, h ,i ,j)               (1) 
 
Where JS is utility or satisfaction from work, w is the level of earnings, h is hours 
of work, i is a vector of individual characteristics, and j is a vector of job 
characteristics comprising variables that affect job satisfaction. Many authors 
accept as a standard assumption that satisfaction and earnings are positively 
related (e.g. Borjas, 1979; Warr, 2007).  There is no accepted list of variables 
affecting job satisfaction, but most authors include age, gender, education, job 
                                                 
3 Apart from the economics literature, psychological studies have also identified a number of 
crucial job satisfaction determinants such as salary, job autonomy, opportunities for promotion, 
quality of supervision, and good working conditions (e.g. Barling et al, 2003). 
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tenure, union membership, and firm location (see Hamermesh, 1977; Freeman, 
1978; Borjas, 1979; Miller, 1990; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Clark, 1997; Montero 
and Vasquez, 2015). These variables may or may not affect earnings. Hence, 
the conventional approach to the econometric specification for job satisfaction 
can be written as:   
 
JSi = a + bx  + zi     (2) 
 
where JSi represents the ith individual and is usually an ordinal variable which 
adopts discrete values corresponding to levels of job satisfaction recorded into 
the questionnaire; x is a vector of all control variables which influence an 
individual’s utility from being in a job, including the level of earnings; z is a 
random error component with z  N(0,1), and a and b are the relevant 
coefficients.  
 
Although the standard conception of utility in economics involves own income 
only, the notion of pay level comparisons was present in the first systematic 
studies of job satisfaction by economists. Dan Hamermesh (1977) utilized a 
sample of American employees and estimated job satisfaction equations. 
Hamermesh's work focused on occupational choice and training, but his 
regression equations include the residual from a wage equation as an 
explanatory variable. That residual enters positively and significantly in a job 
satisfaction regression, which is the same as specifying that individual utility is 
affected by the difference of actual from expected income. The same reasoning 
was followed a few years later by Richard Layard (1980). By appealing to 
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relative deprivation theories and also to Keynes’s concept of relative wages and 
to the works of Fred Hirsch and Tibor Scitovsky, Layard’s central point was that 
well-being depends on income and status relative to expectations.  
 
The trend set by the above two authors continued as more researchers realized 
that the inclusion of the relative or comparison wage in job satisfaction 
equations was very fruitful in terms of understanding and predicting several 
labor market phenomena. For instance, a subsequent study by Cappelli and 
Sherer (1988) concentrating on the airline industry, employed the idea of an 
outside ‘market wage'. The level of the market wage was calculated by 
averaging pay for specific occupations in other airlines, controlling for individual 
wage and other job characteristics. This sort of specification was quite close to 
a pure relative wage effect.  
 
The seminal paper by Clark and Oswald (1996) concentrated exclusively on 
testing the role of relative or comparison income on job satisfaction. The 
authors adopted a utility from work function that included “a comparison or 
reference income level against which the individual compares himself or 
herself.” (Clark and Oswald, 1996: 361). Contrary to the established 
formulations in mainstream theory, a comparison or reference wage is included 
in the individual’s utility from working (u). 
 
u = u(y, y*, h, I, j)               (3) 
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Where y is income, y* is a comparison or reference income, h is hours of work, 
i and j are sets of individual and job parameters respectively. They further 
assumed that utility is increasing in income and decreasing in hours of work. 
Clark and Oswald drew from Adams (1963, 1965) equity theory and also from 
Runciman (1966) and Homans (1961) in social psychology literature. 
Consequently, they assumed that utility from work is declining in the 
comparison pay level (y*), linking this negative relationship to the concepts of 
relative deprivation, envy, jealously or inequity found in the above literature 
(Clark and Oswald, 1996: 361). The authors proceeded to utilize data from the 
British Household Panel Survey (5000 British workers) in order to test the 
hypothesis that utility depends on income relative to a comparison or reference 
level (equation 3). It is indicative that Clark and Oswald pointed out the 
difference with the mainstream view by stating that their findings “…provide little 
support for the simple view, presented in microeconomics textbooks, that a 
worker's level of well-being is a function of absolute income.” (Clark and 
Oswald, 1996: 373). 
 
Andrew Clark (1996) adopted a similar framework in order to test the existence 
of income comparison or relativity effects in a measure of individual subjective 
well-being or job satisfaction. In Clark’s paper, the utility function from working 
is given as: 
 
u = u(y, y*, h, z),      (4)  
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Where y is absolute income, y* is comparison income, h is hours of work, and 
z is a set of taste variables. Assuming that income is evaluated relative to some 
comparison level y*, the higher is comparison income in the above equation, 
the lower is the worker's relative income, and hence the lower is utility. It is also 
worth mentioning that according to Clark, comparisons could take place over 
any number of job characteristics other than income, such as: hours of work, 
promotion, autonomy, authority, size of office and so on (Clark, 1996: 153-54, 
162). By utilizing data on individuals within the same household, Clark was able 
to show that job satisfaction falls as the pay of other workers in the household 
rises. According to Clark, this result “is the opposite of the prediction of the 
standard microeconomic model.” (Clark, 1996: 161). The notion of comparison 
wage as affecting job satisfaction levels was also examined in a similar paper 
by Drakopoulos and Theodossiou (1997). 
 
Subsequent empirical work focusing on the job satisfaction of academics and 
nurses supports the role of reference wage in job satisfaction (e.g. Sloane and 
Ward, 2001; Shields and Price, 2002).  More recently, the work of Card, Mas, 
Moretti and Saez, (2012) examines the job satisfaction of academics of the 
University of California. Their findings suggest that those with lower relative pay 
report lower job satisfaction and have higher quitting intensions, while those 
with higher relative pay report no higher satisfaction. Similarly, Montero and 
Vasquez (2015) found that job satisfaction depends not only on individuals’ own 
wage but also on the relative wage. Furthermore, their results indicate that a 
10% increase in the reference group wage would need to be compensated for 
by a 24.9 % increase in the own wage to give the same level of job satisfaction. 
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The incorporation of pay comparisons into job satisfaction research has a wider 
acceptance in contemporary literature. Apart from the empirical findings, many 
researchers have elaborated on the theoretical basis of pay level comparisons 
in the job satisfaction function. As a result, the role of the level of comparison 
income or wage is more precise and there is also more accuracy in determining 
the appropriate sample to be examined. 
 
III. The Theoretical Basis of Relative Pay  
In most relevant work discussed so far, the presence of comparison income in 
the job satisfaction function has a negative effect on job satisfaction. In other 
words, the income of the reference group creates a negative externality. The 
standard justification for this negative sign, is mainly attributed to the status 
effect which means that the higher earnings of the reference group makes the 
individual unhappy and jealous, thus lowering the sense of well-being.  The 
psychological basis of the status effect is closely related to the relative 
deprivation theory of individual welfare (see Hyman, 1942; Runciman, 1966).  
 
However, there is also the theoretical possibility that comparison income might 
have a positive effect on job satisfaction. This is achieved through the signal 
effect which provides information about future job prospects. This possibility 
has recently been gaining attention. The conceptual basis of the signal effect 
can be found in Hirschman and Rothschild’s (1973) tunnel effect.   According 
to this conception, while other people’s wage increases might make the 
individual jealous, they also provide information about the individual’s own 
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future prospects. The fact that others in the reference group enjoy higher 
earnings acts as a signal of better prospects of doing well in the near future. 
Workers use other people’s wage as a signal of their own future prospects, 
hence they like to work in organizations where other people’s wages are high. 
This approach is similar to the anticipatory feelings effect, where an upper wage 
mobility of others provides information to the individual about pay rise 
expectations in the future (Caplin and Leahy, 2001). It must be noted though, 
that the original argument concerned a situation in which economic growth was 
accompanied by rising income inequality, and referred mainly to the position of 
the poor in developing countries. Hirschman and Rothschild focused on the 
relative importance of growth and inequality, and this important point does not 
seem to be taken into account by recent studies (for a discussion, see Davis, 
forthcoming).  
 
The above two opposite effects can be included in a general job satisfaction 
function. Following Senik (2008), the individual’s A job satisfaction UA at time t, 
can be written as:  
 
UA = f[wA, eA(wB), wB]       (5) 
 
 
Equation (5) shows that the indirect utility from work of individual A depends on 
his/her own wage wA, on his/her expected wage eA, and on agent B’s wage wB. 
Moreover, the expectations of individual A partly depend on B’s observed wage. 
It is also generally accepted that: 
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 f/wA > 0 and f/eA > 0              (6) 
 
However, the sign of f/wB is ambiguous:  
 
f/wB  = (f/eA . eA/wB) + f3     (7) 
  
The first term of equation (7) is positive and it represents the signal effect of B’s 
wage on A’s utility. The second term (f3) represents the direct effect of wB on f, 
and its sign depends on how A feels about B. In case where the status effect 
dominates, this term is negative. If the sign of (7) is negative, then the status 
effect dominates the signal effect. A positive sign of (7) implies that the signal 
effect is dominant (for detailed discussion, see Senik, 2008 and Drakopoulos, 
2016). 
 
In accordance with the insights in Hirschman and Rothschild, some evidence 
of the signal effect is found in transitional economies in which income inequality 
is also significant (Senik, 2004, 2008). More specifically, Senik (2008) argues 
that the respective importance of status and signal effects depend on the level 
of economic uncertainty and labour market mobility. The empirical results in 
Senik (2008) imply that the status effect is dominant in more stable countries 
(e.g. “Old Europe”). Although there is some empirical evidence supporting the 
signal effect in industrialized countries, like in UK and Denmark (Theodossiou 
and Panos, 2007; Clark, Kristensen, and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2009), the vast 
majority of the relevant empirical literature have discovered the presence of 
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status effect rather than the signal effect.4  Similar status effects have been 
found even for a transitional economy like China (GAO and Smyth, 2010; Clark 
and Senik, 2014).   In a more general framework of life satisfaction, Clark and 
Senik (2010) find that the well-being effect of comparison income is 
predominantly negative which means that most people compare upward and 
that the signal effect does not outweigh the status effect. Furthermore, it should 
be pointed out that in many studies that include explicit subjective comparison 
questions in surveys, the empirical results indicate the dominance of relative 
income concerns rather than signal effect (see for instance, McBride, 2001; 
Senik, 2009; Knight and Gunatilaka, 2011). 
 
Some studies follow a different approach and focus on the role of objective rank 
on job satisfaction. Contrary to the standard approach to relative income 
concerns, rank concerns imply that the worker engages in a comparison with 
the entire distribution of wages in his/her establishment. This theoretical 
viewpoint has also support from psychological research (Hagerty, 2000; 
Stewart et al, 2006). Following Boyce, Brown and Moore (2010), the standard 
specification is that the individual relative rank (Ri) is given by the ratio: 
𝑅𝑖 =
𝑖−1
𝑛−1
         (8) 
The individual compares himself/herself to a sample of other people in their 
reference group and assesses whether each sampled individual earns more or 
less than themselves. Those assigned “worse than” (i-1) are compared to the 
total number within the reference group (n-1). Concentrating in a job satisfaction 
                                                 
4  Status effects have been found for Great-Britain (Sloane and Williams, 2000), Germany 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005), Sweden (Bygren, 2004), Europe (Senik, 2008; Clark and Senik, 
2010). See also Warr (2007) for a survey. 
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framework, Brown et al (2008) showed that the normalized rank of an employee 
in the firm’s wage distribution was a powerful predictor of utility from work.  
 
In a more recent paper by Temesgen Kifle (2014), two different measures of 
reference group wages are created: a) cell average wages by age, gender and 
level of education; and b) the ranked position of an individual’s wages in each 
cell. The empirical results based on Australian data indicate that both own 
wages and comparison wages play an important role in determining overall job 
satisfaction. Furthermore, the effect of comparison wages on job satisfaction is 
almost equal to that of own wages when constructed using the ranked position 
of an individual’s wages in each cell. However, no significant effect of cell 
average wages on overall job satisfaction is found (Kifle, 2014).Finally, in other 
studies the concept of rank is centered not so much on income, but on  the 
individual’s power and status in his/her environment (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 
2008; Powdthavee, 2009; Godeshot and Senik, 2015).   
 
IV. Theory and Policy Implications of Pay Level Comparisons 
As was observed previously, research on job satisfaction that incorporates the 
notion of comparison income is abundant and it is still growing. There are 
several papers which have attempted to test the hypothesis in its various forms 
and by using various datasets. Several studies seem to confirm the importance 
of comparison wages in predicting overall job satisfaction. One general finding 
is that increases in everyone’s wages do not have the presumed large effect on 
job satisfaction because of the presence of the negative effect of comparison 
wages. The clear policy implication of this finding is the adaption of fairer and 
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more progressive tax system that helps the comparison wages to change, 
especially when relative income concerns dominate signal effects.  Optimal tax 
policy may need to be geared towards a more equitable distribution given the 
negative externality of high earners (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Kifle, 2014). This 
policy suggestion though, is significantly weakened when the tunnel effect is 
stronger as in countries where the majority of the population lives in poverty 
and/or in an unstable economic and socio-political environment (Senik, 2004; 
2008).  
 
Furthermore, pay level comparisons can be viewed as a quest for status. In 
terms of economic theory, this is an example of a negative externality that 
requires corrective taxation. In order to demonstrate the argument, we can 
follow the simple model given by Layard (2006). The standard utility from work 
function is given as: 
 u = u(y –αy*, h)              (9) 
Where y is real income, y* is comparison or the reference group income and h 
is hours of work. The reference group income can be proportional to average 
income. Assuming there are n people who are identical, with the same utility 
from work function and the same hourly wage of unity, the socially optimal level 
of individual work effort (h) is now given by: 
𝑢1 − 𝑛𝛼
1
𝑛
+ 𝑢2 = 0      (10) 
The second term reflects the negative utility which comes from the rise in 
average income and which adversely affects the utility of all n people. If 
everyone agreed with everyone else how hard to work in order to completely 
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offset the quest for social status, the optimal hours of work will be given by the 
equation: 
𝑢1 − 𝑢1𝛼 + 𝑢2 = 0    (11) 
This social optimum can be achieved by an imposition of a linear income tax 
with marginal rate that will be: 
  t = α                          (12) 
The important implication here is that that social comparisons drive people to 
work longer hours than it is socially desirable, and this calls for an income tax  
which will reduce work effort to a level where the incentive for an individual to 
raise his/her relative income has been fully cancelled. Clearly, the concept of 
‘excess burden’ of taxation that is used in standard cost-benefit analysis needs 
to be reevaluated (for an analytical discussion, see Layard, 2006; Powdthavee, 
2007). Given the above and in a more general framework, the concern for 
relative wages can result in the over-spending on private consumption and 
under-provision of public goods (for a detailed discussion, see Ng, 2003). 
 
The acceptance of the strong role of pay level comparisons in an individual’s 
well-being, also imply a need for change to the structure of consumption taxes. 
A steeply progressive consumption tax is a policy suggestion which originates 
from the idea that status seeking is a positional externality. Similarly to effluent 
charges to curb environmental pollution, a progressive consumption tax could 
neutralize many of the most costly effects of positional externalities (Frank, 
2008).  In the same spirit, Ireland (1998) shows that the presence of positional 
goods can affect labour supply. As Ireland states “… an income tax may offset 
the distortion to labour supply caused by status-seeking, and hence an income 
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tax may yield an improvement in allocative efficiency… Taxes on positional 
goods may be Pareto optimal since they lessen the distortion…” (Ireland, 1998: 
100). Similar conclusions concerning tax policies for positional externalities are 
reached by Ng, 1987; Ireland, 2001; Frank, 2005.  
 
Finally and having in mind the empirical findings about the pursuit of rank, a 
number of authors have questioned the high importance of economic growth as 
a key component of economic policy, at least for high income countries. Since 
there are fixed amounts of rank in society – only one individual can be the 
highest earner, economic growth might not have significant effects on individual 
utility (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004; Boyce et al, 2010).  
 
 
V. Methodological Discussion 
Given the theoretical and policy implications of pay level comparisons, the 
important issue of its impact on mainstream economics arises. In spite of 
abundant empirical evidence pointing to their crucial role, mainstream 
economics does not seem to pay much heed to the findings (see also the 
general account in Frey, 2008). The main reason for this stance is the 
prevalence of the core model of atomistic, utility maximizing agents with 
independent preferences. In mainstream economics, agents are assumed to 
operate in almost complete social isolation given that their utility functions 
include only absolute individual income and absolute amounts of individually 
consumed goods and leisure (Heffetz and Frank, 2011).  The mainstream 
model of rational agents has been criticised by many influential economists 
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from different perspectives.5 Clearly, the literature on the role of pay level 
comparisons on job satisfaction reinforces the criticism of the established 
model. Apart from the dominance of the mainstream agents, there are 
additional methodological reasons which seem to be linked to the subjective 
well-being research in general, and to the job satisfaction literature in particular. 
These are: 1. A strong mistrust against the method of stated preferences and 
2. The inherent bias against the integration of psychological findings. 
 
Mistrust towards stated preferences 
The empirical literature examining job satisfaction as well as the literature on 
pay level comparisons is mainly based on questionnaire surveys analysis. The 
same holds true for life satisfaction research. Typical questions concerning job 
satisfaction levels and salary levels are: “how do you feel about your work?” 
and “how do you rate your satisfaction with your salary?”  The participants must 
answer on a scale (usually from 1 to 7 or 10, where 1 is very bad).  The question 
regarding the reference group asks, “With whom do you most tend to compare 
your salary?” (e.g. Montero and Vasquez; 2015; Hauret and Williams, 2017). In 
general, the stated preferences approach as a valid scientific method is almost 
universally accepted in the relevant literature of subjective well-being.  
 
However, mainstream economics has a long tradition against accepting stated 
preferences. Instead, the revealed preference approach dominates. The 
negative attitude towards questionnaire surveys and opinion/perception 
                                                 
5 There is a large literature on this important issue. A few recent indicative examples are: 
Akerlof, 1997; Sen, 2002; Sobel, 2005; Davis, 2010; Postlewaite, 2011; Heffetz and Frank, 
2011. 
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surveys has historical roots which go back to the 1940’s debate concerning 
theoretical and actual business’s behavior (for a discussion, see Boulier and 
Goldfarb, 1998). In other words, the standard practice of many economists has 
been to infer decision processes from data on observed choices. This is the 
basis for making predictions concerning economic agents’ choice behavior. 
Alan Blinder has long identified the mistrust regarding empirical findings based 
on subjective well-being related questions by mainstream economists: 
“Economists are skeptical that you can learn much by asking people. We are 
trained to study behavior by watching what people do (usually in markets), not 
by listening to what they say.” (Blinder, 1991: 90).  
 
Aside from the bias towards observed choices, there are other related reasons 
for the mainstream negative stance towards subjective well-being research. 
The satisfaction surveys approach implies an individual cardinal utility function, 
a concept which is rejected by current mainstream theory as having no scientific 
basis.  Since Pareto’s work, there is a long mainstream methodological tradition 
which accepts ordinal utility functions only (for an extensive discussion, see 
Van Praag, 1991; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonel, 2004). Apart from 
cardinality, another widespread argument against the use of stated preferences 
has to do with concerns that subjective well-being responses are subject to 
nonsampling bias (Powdthavee, 2007). In particular, it is claimed that the use 
of subjective data as dependent variables is questionable because the 
measurement error appears to correlate with a large set of characteristics and 
behaviors (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). However, it is quite difficult to 
reconcile this position with the recent growth of the use of stated preferences 
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in many fields of economics including the extensive use of contingent valuation 
in environmental and health economics (e.g. Pearce, 2002; Bridges, 2003; see 
also List et al, 2004). 
Although a number of authors on job satisfaction have identified the mainstream 
negative attitude towards one of the basic assumption of their field, only a few 
have attempted to supply a detailed response. Richard Easterlin, one of the 
pioneers of the subjective well-being research, focuses on the “sociological 
bias” of mainstream economics. According to Easterlin (2004), the general 
hostility of mainstream economists towards subjective empirical evidence has 
to do with unfounded preconceptions indoctrinated by graduate economic 
training and disciplinary structure against survey and questionnaire evidence. 
Following a similar line of explanation, Bernard Van Praag and Ada Ferrer-i-
Carbonel refer to the mainstream position as “a dogmatic stand that it is 
impossible” (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonel, 2004: 4; see also Van Praag, 
2011). Thus, there seems to be a growing tension between the available 
evidence and the standard mainstream conception of rational choice, and this 
tension is rooted in the history and method of mainstream economics (for a 
discussion, see Zouboulakis, 2014). Clearly, the mistrust towards stated 
preferences has to do with the dominant conception of economics as a science 
and its scientific foundations.  
 
Bias against incorporating psychological findings 
 
The strong links to psychological research was present since the beginnings of 
the job satisfaction analysis by economists. The first authors to consider the 
economic significance of job satisfaction made references to psychological 
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research in order to provide theoretical basis to their analysis (e.g. Hamermesh, 
1977; Freeman, 1978). The connection to psychology become stronger and 
more explicit in the more specialized work examining the role of pay level 
comparisons in job satisfaction. As was seen above, in one of the most 
influential papers on pay level comparisons, Andrew Clark and Andrew Oswald 
based their formulation of job satisfaction function on the psychological theory 
of relative deprivation (Clark and Oswald, 1996). References to other social 
sciences findings and especially to psychology are common in other important 
papers on pay level comparisons such as in Clark, 1996 and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2005.  Even in more recent work on job satisfaction, the appeal to psychological 
theories is explicitly stated (see for instance, Bryson et al, 2012; Kiffle, 2014; 
Hauret and Williams, 2017). In the more general framework of subjective well-
being research, the psychological background is frequently connected to 
economic theory (e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). The explicit links to 
other social sciences is a conscious methodological stance. As Richard 
Easterlin writes: “We cannot comprehend the world about us without knowledge 
of the facts and insights provided by the other social sciences.” (Easterlin, 
2004:19). In the same vein, Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonel emphasize that 
“…it is hard to argue that economics has nothing to do with sociology or 
psychology or the other way around. [Their historical separation]…is 
unfortunate because those artificial scientific boundaries make it difficult to 
make a complete study of phenomena that have economic, sociological, and 
psychological aspects.” (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonel, 2004). 
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However, incorporating concepts and findings from other social sciences and 
especially from psychological research, is not common in mainstream 
economic theory. The anti-psychology tradition of mainstream theory has deep 
roots in the evolution of its methodology. In particular, since the second 
generation marginalists, aversion to findings from other social sciences and 
especially from psychology, became the established trait. The stance of the 
influential neoclassical economist Irwin Fisher is indicative: Fisher was explicitly 
against the inclusion of   psychological theories and concepts in economics 
mainly because psychology was considered as a ‘soft’ subject not worthy for 
consideration by the ‘hard’ science of economics (Fisher, 1892: 11, 23). In the 
same conceptual tradition, Vilfredo Pareto believed that the construction of the 
fictional model of economic man was adequate for the needs of economic 
theory, thus clearly implying that psychological findings are not necessary for 
economics (Pareto, 1906; see also McLure, 2010). Anti-psychologism was 
reinforced by Lionel Robbins’ influential methodological contributions.  Robbins’ 
insistence that psychology ought to be kept out of economic analysis was partly 
motivated by a desire to protect the independence of economics as a scientific 
discipline (Robbins, 1932: 83–84). 
 
In more modern times, one of the main intentions of Samuelson’s revealed 
preference theory was to dismiss the alleged psychological concepts of utility 
theory (Samuelson, 1938; Samuelson, 1947). The tendency of mainstream 
economics to ignore concepts and findings from other social sciences and 
especially from psychology, continued in the post war era. The influential paper 
by Stigler and Becker (1977), where they claimed that preference theory can 
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free economics of any need to turn to other disciplines such as psychology, is 
a representative example (for a detailed account of the problematic relationship 
between mainstream economics and psychology, see Lewin, 1996;  Rabin, 
2002; Bruni and Sugden,  2007; Goodwin, 2016). 
 
The gradual rise of the behavioural economics with its strong psychological 
dimension has weakened the mainstream position towards psychological 
research (see Sent, 2004; Frantz, 2009). However, the negative attitude 
towards importing psychology into economics is still prevalent. Expressing the 
dominant mainstream position, the leading economist David Levine strongly 
rejects the criticism of mainstream economics by behavioral economists. 
Levine argues that the connection of behavioral economics to psychology and 
neuroscience is doomed to fail because the goals of psychologists and 
economists are different, and that this has implications for importing ideas from 
psychology into economics (Levine, 2012:125). 
 
The tendency to separate economics from other social sciences, including 
psychology, also has to do with the perception of economics as the most 
advanced of the social sciences, and hence the one that is closest to the 
physical sciences (see also Drakopoulos and Katselidis, 2015). The dismissal 
of psychological findings was linked to the effort of establishing the scientific 
character of economics. The rejection of all “metaphysical and psychological 
elements” was one of the main requirements for the creation of the ‘scientific’ 
status of economics (Dow, 2002: 170–175). This increasing insularity of 
mainstream economics seems to go in tandem with its conception as the 
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‘superior social science’  based on positivism and physical science inspired 
methodology (see also Frey and Benz, 2004; Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan, 
2015). 
 
VI. Concluding comments 
Nowadays, the study of job satisfaction is an established research area in which 
many economists are involved. Decades of job satisfaction research have 
provided useful insights into several economic phenomena. The concept of pay 
level comparisons is widely employed in the job satisfaction literature as an 
important analytical tool which has strong empirical grounding and has helped 
the further comprehension of many labour market phenomena. Backed by 
similar results from life satisfaction research, pay level comparisons 
formulations have also important theoretical and policy implications. Given that 
pay level comparisons can theoretically be conceived as negative externalities 
and as a quest for status, the standard optimal tax conclusions need to be 
altered. The presence of pay level comparisons imply that  income tax policies 
should be geared towards a more equitable distribution and consumption taxes 
should be more progressive. 
 
In spite of the abundance of empirical findings confirming the strong role of pay 
level comparisons in job satisfaction, their impact on mainstream economics is 
minimal. The paper suggested that the dominant economic methodology is one 
main reason for this state of affairs. In particular, the mainstream 
methodological tendency to reject stated preferences and survey evidence, 
was identified as an important reason for the limited appeal of the relevant job 
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satisfaction research findings. Against the mainstream methodological 
preconceptions, job satisfaction researchers were and still are much more open 
in accepting stated preferences as a methodologically valid basis for subjective 
well-being research. The in-built bias against incorporating concepts from other 
social sciences and particularly from psychology, was suggested as the other 
major reason. Contrary to the mainstream tradition, subjective well-being 
specialists are willing to incorporate findings from other social studies fields. 
Drawing from work conducted by psychologists and sociologists, was a central 
feature of job satisfaction research even from its first appearance in economics 
literature.  
 
It seems that few job satisfaction specialists have realized that the limited 
appeal of their findings among orthodox economics are mainly due to the nature 
of mainstream economic methodology. In a broader setting, the core 
assumption of economic rationality excludes social influences on economic 
decisions and is hostile to interdependent preferences. In addition, the 
conception of economics as a “hard” science similar to physical sciences is 
presumably at odds with subjective/survey based evidence. Observed choices 
only are conceived as having any scientific validity. In a similar vein, the 
importation of concepts and findings from psychological research are viewed 
with methodological suspicion.  
 
Consequently, the continued reluctance of mainstream economics to pay 
serious heed to the job satisfaction empirical results and to policy suggestions 
arising from the relevant research, are of methodological origin. A few 
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prominent figures in job satisfaction research have realized the mainstream 
methodological attitude. It is necessary though, that job satisfaction specialists 
should consider more seriously the basic components of mainstream economic 
methodology that relate to their research field.  
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